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Abstract
The paper integrates the two-pillar Phillips curve, which explains expected inflation by the
money growth trend, within a simple macro model. A Taylor-like interest rule contains also a
money growth target. The model takes into account serially correlated supply and money
demand shocks; the latter induce goods demand shocks, thereby establishing a feedback
mechanism from money to markets which is missing in the modern New Keynesian approach.
Two groups of market agents are distinguished from which one derives inflation expectations
from money growth trend figures whereas the other builds rational expectations by way of
learning. The inspection of output and inflation variances show that a policy of reacting to
excess money growth requires precise information on shock characteristics whereas inflation-
gap and output-gap oriented interest policies provide more robust stabilization services.
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The inclusion of the monetary pillar in the ECB's
stated strategy should probably best be seen as an
attempt to sing a lullaby as the German public are
gently moved from one bed to another.
Patrick Honohan1
I Introduction
The erection of the famous "two pillars" in the ECB's monetary policy strategy results from
admitted severe difficulties of integrating monetary and non-monetary elements into a
generalized theory of inflation. This is particularly true, as the traditional IS-LM apparatus,
where a policy-controlled money stock variable affects employment and prices, has fallen
from favour in academia (Allsopp and Vines 2000). Over the years, the ECB offered various
lines of argumentation in favour of this two-pillar strategy, starting from the criterion that
monetary policy should be "robust" in the view of model uncertainty (ECB 2000, Issing
2002), and taking up the distinction between short-run and long-run determinants of inflation
in later years (ECB 2004: 55-66).
Thus, each pillar of the ECB strategy presents a different analytical approach, and a
different time dimension, of the macroeconomic process. Many academic critics remained
unconvinced, however, and demanded a more integrated approach or assessed the monetary
pillar to be superfluous altogether: if the central bank – by referring to the "real analysis" of
the economy, i.e. by exploring tensions between supply and demand on the goods and labour
markets – succeeds to control inflation in each short-run period, a separate long-run "monetary
analysis" appears to be redundant (e.g. Galí et al. 2004, Woodford 2006).
In recent years, in a series of papers (Gerlach 2003, 2004, Assenmacher-Wesche and
Gerlach 2006), a new approach was presented that claims to offer a synthesis of "real" and
"monetary" forces in the macro process. It is a "two-pillar Phillips curve" where expected
future inflation is explained by the past money growth trend. Of course, in a monetarist or new
classical world, that idea would hardly represent an innovation. Combining the Phillips curve
with a demand function derived from the quantity theory yields a solution where the
                                                
1 Quoted from Gerlach (2004: 430).
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(expected) rate of inflation is determined by the money growth rate. But given the modern
New Keynesian model setup, where the money supply is identified as endogenous (and
therefore usually disappears from the model equations), it turned out to be hard to explain
how the quantity of money affects essential macro variables.
Gerlach's main intention is to demonstrate empirically that inflation in the euro area can be
decomposed into high- and low-frequency movements that are correlated with monetary
growth and the output gap, respectively, a finding that justifies the inclusion of the money
growth trend as a shift variable in a Phillips curve equation. It may appear that this also
justifies the upholding of the "reference" money growth rate in the ECB's policy concept,
where it provides a measure of long-term risks to price stability. But this would be a rash
conclusion. Gerlach (2004) finds that money is a useful indicator among others; a separate
pillar focused on money is not necessary.
Thus, the existence of "monetarist" inflation expectations among market agents and the
effects of pursuing also monetary targets by means of interest rate policies ought be analyzed
more thoroughly, before an assessment of the ECB strategy can be made. The following paper
extends Gerlach's work in two ways:
• Whereas he uses a single-equation approach, we envisage a two-pillar Phillips curve as
forming a part of a standard macro model where also the money variable is endogenized and
different assumptions are explored with regard to the state of information and rationality on
the part of market agents.
• The focus is not on empirical questions, but rather on analytical topics of stability of the
macro model and on welfare-theoretic aspects of the existence of monetarist beliefs and
policies in the model economy. The question is whether the inclusion of a money growth
target in a Taylor-like interest rule outperforms a policy strategy that concentrates on the
inflation and/or output gap, if the economy is hit by supply, goods demand and money
demand shocks.
The program of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section II summarizes the
analytical core of Gerlach's approach and discusses some lines of critique. In Section III,  the
two-pillar Phillips curve is supplemented by a simple demand function and an interest rule
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that describes the behaviour of the central bank. The aim is to explore how the model reacts to
supply and money demand shocks. Section IV extends the analysis by allowing two groups of
market agents from which one adheres to monetarist beliefs whereas the other builds rational
expectations by using all available information. In both these Sections it is found that the
model is globally stable, but monetarist beliefs and policies tend to distort efficient adjustment
paths after shocks have occurred. Section V concludes.
II Including Monetarist Expectations in a Phillips Curve
Gerlach (2004) sets up the two-pillar Phillips curve as
p p p yt t
e
t t t
s= + + ++ − −δ κ α ε1 1 1 [1]
where pt  is the inflation rate, yt  the (log of the) output gap and ε ts  is a supply shock. The
approach builds on the assumption of staggered price setting à la Calvo which lets expected
future inflation enter the equation2; however widely shared beliefs on stylized empirical facts
(e.g. Mankiw 2001) point to the inclusion of lagged inflation also (with δ κ+ = 1). The
forward-looking expectation term is determined by the once-lagged money growth trend:3
p mt
e
t
T+ −=1 1 [2]
The latter is modelled as a moving average of actual money growth where λ  serves as a filter
coefficient:
m m mt
T
t t
T= + − −λ λ1 1  [3]
From the preceding equations, a reduced-form two-pillar Phillips curve can be derived,
                                                
2 A modern textbook treatment of the microfoundations of the New Keynesian Phillips curve is
Carlin and Soskice (2006: 606-608). See also Mankiw and Reiss (2002).
3 Gerlach also explores two alternative hypotheses, the explanation of future expected inflation by
real-growth-rate adjusted money growth and by the inflation trend itself. Econometric support for
these hypotheses is somewhat weaker though, particularly for the second alternative. This implies that
information on recent money growth rates is not totally embedded in inflation itself, i.e. money
figures deliver additional information for prediction.
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which, besides the money growth variable, contains once- and twice-lagged output gaps and
inflation rates (the derivation for a somewhat simplified model setup will be given in next
Section). Econometric tests then show that "while money may not be useful for explaining
movements of inflation around the steady state, it is helpful for understanding changes over
time in the steady state. Second, inflation also depends on the output gap, which should be
understood as a catch-all for the economic analysis of the [ECB's] second pillar" (Gerlach
2004: 424).
Two major points of the Gerlach approach are worth mentioning:
(1) In any well defined macro theory, expectations should be explained in a model-
consistent way, i.e. by solving the system of the expected values of the model's equations.4
Contrary to that approach, Gerlach suppresses the internal determinants of the expected future
rate of inflation and uses some measure of money growth instead. But why do market agents
not build expectations according to the "true" model?
(2) As a corollary of this first objection, Gerlach offers no market transmission mechanism
showing how money affects inflation, or any other macro variable, through factual market
forces. One of Gerlach's critics stated: "If money does not affect objective behaviour of
economic agents, it is hard to see how it would impact on their expectations of that behaviour.
If money is to be integrated into two-pillar framework, it has to be done according to
monetarist interpretation, based on the idea that money affects behaviour via liquidity
constraints" (Frank Brown in Gerlach 2004: 429). Defending his approach, Gerlach (2004:
413) argues that "the assumption that money growth determines expected inflation should not
be taken literally"; instead he interprets "the ECB as believing that money growth captures the
stance of monetary policy and the general state of aggregate demand, and that it therefore can
be used as a proxy for expected inflation".
This line of defence concedes that monetary policy acts through its impact on goods
demand. From this it follows that observing the output gap should be the main element of a
monetary policy strategy; apart from "technical" problems5, again the monetary pillar appears
                                                
4 Appendix I gives an example of how this can be done in a simple model.
5 The difficulty of gaining timely and non-distorted information from output gap figures may
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superfluous. Even authors who are classified as belonging to the "money camp" emphasize
that "the quantity theory does not claim, and the importance claimed for monetary aggregates
in the determination of inflation does not rest on, a direct channel linking money growth and
inflation" (Nelson 2003: 1042). Nelson sharpens his point by arguing that providing
econometric support for a direct money-inflation nexus over and above a link given by the
output gap and the Phillips curve, suggests measurement errors or misspecification, but no
additional evidence of the quantity theory. This line of reasoning paves the way for a
"Keynesian" interpretation of a famous Friedman dictum: "In the long run, inflation is always
and everywhere an excess nominal GDP phenomenon" (Gordon 1997: 17).
The monetary influence on inflation is thus reduced to a goods demand channel; this
however ignores the impact of expectations. Hence, an alternative, and perhaps more
conclusive way of arguing in favour of the importance of the monetary pillar can be found by
making reference to the phenomenon of non-rational expectations on the part of market
agents. The recently developed "learning" approach in macro theory has dissociated itself
from the widely held dogma, stipulated in former times, that the assumption of model-
consistent, rational expectations is an indispensable element of optimizing behaviour (Evans
and Honkapohja 2001). Factual market mechanisms, particularly if dynamic and stochastic
features prevail, simply may be too complex to be properly understood by individual agents
(DeCanio 1979). They may suffer from incomplete knowledge with respect to the magnitude
of functional parameters or even with respect to the qualitative character of market relations;
moreover, it cannot be excluded a priori that they believe in "wrong" theories.
That is not to say that the money-inflation nexus is established by way of some
superstitious belief.6 There is broad empirical evidence of a cointegration of money and prices
(Nelson 2003, De Grauwe and Polan 2005). But even if this finding does not necessarily
verifies the quantity theory on a scientific level, market agents particularly in Europe may put
                                                                                                                                                        
nevertheless justify the observation of more easy-to-collect money data, which may signal
contemporary or imminent demand behaviour (Coenen et al. 2003, Galí et al. 2004: 19-20, Beck and
Wieland 2006).
6 If only monetarist beliefs produce inflation, this would be a case for welfare enhancing
intervention on the science market: "It might be for the greater social good to tax all Monetarist
writings and to subsidize Keynesian ones" (Hahn 1982: 93).
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some trust in the statement that exogenous money causes inflation. As long as this statement
is debated within academic circles, with varying weights of the groups of supporters and
critics, one cannot reject the hypothesis that a significant part of private agents subscribe to
more or less elaborated versions of the traditional quantity theory.
III A Phillips Curve Model with Endogenous Money
In order to facilitate the formal analysis, Gerlach's starting equation [1] is simplified by
dropping the lagged inflation rate and by substituting actual for lagged output. This renders
the equation conformable to the New Keynesian supply curve (δ  now represents a discount
parameter which is near, but below unity); lagged macro variables will reappear anyway
because of the specification of the forward expectation term.
p p yt t
e
t t
s= + ++δ α ε1 [4]
Also, the lag structure of the nexus between inflation expectation and money growth trend is
modified to
p mt
e
t
T+ =1 [5]
The general algorithm used by Gerlach to calculate future expected inflation is maintained.
Substituting [5] and [3] into [4] yields
p m m yt t t
T
t t
s= + − + +−δ λ λ α ε1 1  [6]
Last period's version of [4] and [5] is given by
p m yt t
T
t t
s− − − −= + +1 1 1 1δ α ε [7]
This can be solved for mt
T−1 and substituted into [6], which then yields
p m p y yt t t t t t
s
t
s= + − + − − + − −− − −δ λ λ α α λ ε λ ε1 1 11 1 1      [8]
The decision of explaining inflation expectations by the money growth trend instead of the
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growth rate itself (λ < 1) leads to the inclusion of lagged terms in the Phillips curve equation.
Extending Gerlach's paper, now a (traditional) demand curve is added that deviates from
the currently wide-spread fashion of using a micro-founded Euler consumption demand
function.7 Therefore the forward-looking expected-income term is missing in
y g i pt t t t
e= − − +β 1  [9]
where gt  indicates autonomous spending and it  is a short-term nominal interest rate that is
controlled by the central bank. Here, also, future expected inflation is determined by [5] and
[3]. This leads to
y g i m mt t t t t
T= − − − − −β λ λ1 1  [10]
By using last period's version of [9]
y g i mt t t t
T− − − −= − −1 1 1 1β   [11]
the demand function finally reads
y y g g i i mt t t t t t t= − + − − − − − −− − −1 1 11 1 1λ λ β λ λ      [12]
It is assumed that both types of shocks exhibit serial correlation and evolve as AR(1)
processes where the persistence parameters are smaller than unity and the ω t  terms represent
white noise.
ε η ε ω
ε η ε ω
t
m m
t
m
t
m
t
s s
t
s
t
s
= +
= +
−
−
1
1
[13]
A crucial deviation from the traditional quantity theory is the acknowledgement that money
                                                
7 The reason is simply that this fashionable demand function, which for strange reasons is called
New Keynesian, implies a strict determination of aggregate investment by household saving (Clarida
et al. 1999). Those who adhere to this line of thinking have to assume perfect and fully established
financial markets in a General Equilibrium style, and to forget everything that was written on the
investment-saving issue since the time of the Keynesian revolution in macroeconomics (cf. Goodhart
2004).
8 Heinz-Peter Spahn
is endogenous; basically it adapts to the "needs of trade". This argument first was put forward
as a critical point against Friedman's monetarism (Kaldor 1982), and it is now a standard
theme that recently was emphasized in Woodford's (2006) assessment of the ECB's "monetary
pillar". In order to capture "bubbles" in money demand the following money growth rate
equation8 is supplemented by a shock term which is modelled as independent from interest
rates, firstly in order to facilitate the formal analysis, secondly because the sign of money
demand reactions to interest rate movements may be ambiguous, particularly in constellations
of a flat term structure.
m p yt t t t
m= + + ε [14]
Surely, the knowledge of [14] is apt to undermine the monetarist belief [5]. But given the still
rather high reputation of the quantity theory among economic experts and non-experts, and the
necessity to explore the consequences of perhaps non-rational expectation formation, it
appears sensible to include both equations [5] and [14] in the model setup.
Up to this point, money is a pure "bootstrap" variable in the macro process: apart from the
shock term ε tm , it is determined by output and inflation, but it has only an "imagined" effect on
inflation which becomes effective, though, through the forward expectation channel. A
simple, although still perhaps unsatisfactory way of describing a factual market mechanism
which justifies the monetarist belief [5] is to let autonomous demand gt  depend on excess
money demand (although a less deterministic feedback loop would be preferable):
g gt t
m= + θ ε [15]
Turning to monetary policy, we might envisage a pure way of monetarist policy making
that consists of a money growth trend targeting that obeys to the above-described logic of
building inflation expectations. The central bank thus is assumed to apply a forward-looking
Taylor-like instrument rule that takes the form
                                                
8 Compared to the traditional quantity equation, in order to simplify the formal analysis, the growth
rate of output is replaced by the logarithm of the output gap (and the logarithm of equilibrium output
is normalized to zero).
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i r p p p r m pt t t
e
t
e
t t
T= + + − = + + −∗ + + ∗ ∗ ∗1 1 1µ µ µ    [16]
where rt
∗  denotes the real equilibrium interest rate and p∗  the target inflation rate. After
substituting mt
T  from [3], and manipulating the equation by analogy to the steps described
between [6] and [8], the rule turns out to be
i i r r p yt t t t t t t
m= − + − − + + + +− ∗ −∗1 1 11 1λ λ λ µ ε        [17]
if [14] is applied and p∗ = 0 . Money trend growth targeting thus leads to interest rate
smoothing, but essentially the central bank responds in a similar way to macro variables as in
more commonly analyzed Taylor rule strategies. Therefore, and as there is actually no central
bank that relies exclusively on money growth trend targeting, this variant of policy making is
not explored any further.
An obvious candidate for a "reasonable" and simple policy strategy is a rule9 based on
contemporary variables, which include, in an ECB style of policy making, deviations from a
money growth target (or "reference value") m∗ :
i r p p p y m mt t t t t t= + + − + + −∗ ∗ ∗γ ϕ µ    [18]
The assumption of µ > 0 , of course, is highly contentious as it was found that the ECB hardly
ever based its decisions on interest rate movements on deviations of money growth from the
reference value (Gerlach 2004, Reichlin 2006). But µ > 0  in [18] can be justified on the
ground that the consequences of money-based interest rate policies (which are recommended
to the ECB time and again) have to be explored, particularly if market agents believe in some
money-inflation nexus.
Inserting endogenous money mt  from [14] into [18], the hybrid Taylor rule
i r p yt t t t t
m= + + + + + +∗ 1 γ µ ϕ µ µ ε    [19]
                                                
9 Talking about "rules" is not meant to attribute a mechanical behaviour to central bankers. Interest
rate reaction rules are regarded as lists of factors that guide monetary policy decisions. Assuming
constant reaction parameters only helps to obtain a rough image of the ensuing effects. In the
following model computations these parameters are varied, and some results hint to the merits of
choosing optimal values of reaction parameters.
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(where the inflation target p∗ and consequently the reference value of money growth m∗  are
chosen to be zero) reveals that the inclusion of the money growth target has two effects:
• It merely amplifies the interest rate reactions to the inflation and the output gap, thereby
establishing a reaction to the latter, if the policy setup otherwise would have ignored this issue
(i.e. if ϕ = 0);
• and it gives rise to an interest rate response to money demand shocks or bubbles, which
might help to stabilize financial markets and to dampen goods demand shocks which, by way
of [15], result from those bubbles.
Equations [8], [12-15] and [19] can be reduced to a dynamic system where Ψ , Φ  and Θ
represent 2 2×  matrices. The real equilibrium interest rate rt∗  is assumed to neutralize the
constant part of autonomous spending g , so that, apart from shocks, in equilibrium yt = 0.
y
p
y
p
t
t
t
t
t
m
t
s
t
m
t
s
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[20]
Dynamic stability depends on the eigenvalues of Ψ  being smaller than unity in absolute
terms. It turns out that this condition is met if the twofold inequality
λ
α δ γ δ ϕ α µ δ ββ
<
+ + − + + > − −
1
1 1
1 1
     
    [21]
holds. Obviously µ > 0  is not necessary for convergence. The problem can be stated more
clearly, if the discount parameter, which is near unity anyhow, is neglected by letting δ = 1.
Then the second relation in [21] is simply γ µ+ > 0. This implies that the standard Taylor
principle in dynamic macro models (Woodford 2001), a more than proportionate nominal-
interest-rate reaction to inflation (γ > 0), suffices to ensure that the equilibrium [ p pt = ∗ ,
yt = 0] will be achieved, independently of any monetarist beliefs shared by market agents.
The different ability of interest rate policies to dampen the persistence of the market
process during the adjustment after the occurrence of shocks, by reacting to inflation, output
and money gaps respectively, can be assessed by differentiating the variable eigenvalue of Ψ
(the other one is a constant) with respect to γ , ϕ  and µ . It can be found that this eigenvalue is
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lowered
• if γ  is increased,
• if ϕ  is increased, given the case that γ µ δ δ+ < −1  ,
• if µ  is increased, given the case that 1 1 1+ < + + +γ ϕ β α δ  .
These results indicate that a Taylor policy oriented by the inflation gap always helps to
stabilize macro dynamics whereas output and money oriented interest rate policies do so only
if some parameter restrictions are met.
A second test concerning the stabilization properties of the different varieties of Taylor
interest rate policies explores the variance of the endogenous variables. From [20], a solution
can be derived10 that shows var y   and var p  as functions of var ωm  and var ω s :
var
var
var
var
y
p
m
s
 
 
 
 


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
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Λ Λ
Λ Λ
11 12
21 22
ω
ω [22]
The coefficients Λij  represent (rather unwieldy) multipliers, containing all parameters of the
model. In order to demonstrate, firstly, the effects of varying Taylor coefficients that are
attached to the inflation and money growth gap, γ  and µ , respectively, a specific calibration
of the other parameters was chosen: α λ ϕ= = = 0 1. , η η θm s= = = 0 5. , δ = 1 and β = 3 .
The variance of money demand and supply shocks are normalized to unity.
Figure 1 displays the dependence of the magnitude of the Λij  terms on variations of γ  and
µ  between zero and unity.
• With regard to inflation variability, enlarging γ  and µ  starting from low values lowers
both the impact of supply and money demand shocks (cases Λ21  and Λ22); but given some
moderate reaction to the money gap, inflation variability can be contained more efficiently by
raising γ .
• A stronger reaction to the money growth gap also helps to dampen the impact of supply
shocks on output variability (case Λ12 ), a service that γ , being oriented by the inflation issue,
would not deliver; the coefficient µ  in [19] acts indirectly (and perhaps involuntarily) as a
                                                
10 Details are given in Appendix II.
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Figure 1 (illustrating Equation [22]): multipliers of shock variability on output and inflation
variability, depending on reactions to the inflation and the money gap
money demand shock supply shock
var y 
Λ11
1
0
1
0
γ µ
1.2
Λ12
1
0
1
5
γ µ
25
var p 
Λ21
1
0
1
0
γ µ
5
Λ22
1
0
1
0
γ µ
100
tool for stabilizing output around the full-employment level.
• If γ  is low, money demand shocks have a non-linear effect on output variability (case Λ11),
which results from the feedback from ε tm  on autonomous spending. A rising value of µ  at first
succeeds to neutralize this induced goods demand shock, but beyond some optimal value a
precautionary policy impulse that responds to the building up of money balances puts an
unnecessary restriction on demand.11 If optimal interest rate policies would be implemented
instead of instrument rules, the central banker ought to have precise information about the
characteristics of the various shocks; optimal reaction parameters would be difficult to
                                                
11 Note that with θ = 0  in [15], this ambiguity would be absent. The slope of the plane would be
positive throughout, indicating a clear welfare loss due to the interest rate reaction to excess money
growth.
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Figure 2 (illustrating Equation [22]): multipliers of shock variability on output and inflation
variability, depending on shock persistence and the reaction to the money gap
money demand shock supply shock
var y 
Λ11
1
0
1
0
µ
1.5
ηm
Λ12
1
0
1
0
µ
30
ηs
var p 
Λ21
1
0
1
0
µ
3
ηm
Λ22
1
0
1
10
µ
35
ηs
compute in reality. Obviously, keeping µ  at zero and γ  high, yield an efficient and more
robust response to the impact of money demand shocks on output variability.
Taken together, these results imply that reacting to the money growth gap (µ > 0) delivers
questionable stabilization results. It produces unnecessary output volatility in case of money
demand shocks, whereas the inflation effects of these shocks can be handled more efficiently
by using the inflation-gap reaction coefficient γ . The same is true with regard to the impact of
supply shock effects of inflation: stabilization can also be obtained by relying on γ . The
remaining case, Λ12 , only at first glance speaks for µ > 0; but the interest rate rule [19] shows
that output can be protected against supply shocks also by increasing the value of  ϕ .
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Figure 2 explores the consequences of pursuing (also) a money target further by laying the
focus on variable persistence of shocks. Now the inflation reaction parameter is fixed at
γ = 0 5. , whereas µ , ηm  and ηs are flexible12, and the other parameters are kept unchanged at
their values given above:
• Again, there appears to be an optimal degree of the money gap parameter in the case of
money demand shocks (Λ11 and Λ21). The macroeconomic costs of exceeding this optimal
value of µ  are particularly pronounced with regard to output. A larger reaction parameter µ
does not dampen output or inflation variability if the persistence of money demand shocks
increases.
• More persistent supply shocks reduce the variance of inflation anyhow (case Λ22); if
supply shocks are more rigid, inflation fluctuates less. A rising value of µ  helps to keep
output variability low in case of supply shocks (case Λ12 ), but so would ϕ  also.
IV A Model with Hybrid Inflation Expectations and Learning
A major shortcoming of the above analysis is that model-consistent expectations have been
completely suppressed in favour of the supposed belief in the inflationary impact of money
growth. Therefore an obvious modification of the model is to allow "rational" expectations in
addition to monetarist beliefs.
The starting point is the supply function where expected future inflation now is determined,
partly, by the influence of trend money growth and, partly, by model-consistent forward-
looking expectations (which are to be explained endogenously13). The weights attached to
both factors add up to unity.
p m p yt t
T
t
e
t t
s= + − + ++δ σ σ α ε1 1  [23]
Substituting [3] into [23] and proceeding by analogy to the steps from [6] to [8], the supply
                                                
12 In all cases, of course, variability of endogenous variables explodes if ηm  and ηs approach unity.
13 The term pt
e
+1 in [23] represents these rational forward-looking expectations only, whereas
predicted inflation by the "monetarist" group is given directly by mt
T .
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function evolves into
p p p m p
y y
t t
e
t
e
t t
t t t
s
t
s
= − − − + + −
+ − − + − −
+ −
− −
1 1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
σ δ λ σ δ λ λ
α λ ε λ ε
     
   
[24]
By following the same pattern of derivation, the demand function
y g i m pt t t t
T
t
e= − − − − +β σ σ1 1  [25]
turns out to be
y y g g
i i p p m
t t t t
t t t
e
t
e
t
= − + − −
− − − − − + − − −
− −
− +
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
λ λ
β λ σ σ λ σ λ
   
       
[26]
Taking [13-15], [19], [24] and [26], the model economy can be written in the compact
form
v v v s et t 1
e
t t t= + + ++ − −Ω Ψ Φ Θ1 1 [27]
Here, Ω , Ψ , Φ  and Θ  are 2 2×  matrices.14 The endogenous variables are comprised in the
vector vt t ty p= ; ' , their next period's expected values in vt 1e+ , and their lagged values in
vt−1. It is assumed that agents can observe time t shocks in the current period; therefore
p pt
e
t= . The equation is completed by st tm ts− − −=1 1 1ε ε; '  and et tm ts= ω ω; ' . As in the
model of Section III, r gt
∗ = β  and p m∗ ∗= = 0 . In order to simplify the calculation, the
persistence parameters are assumed to be equal (η η ηm s= = ).
The model architecture reflects the existence of two groups of agents, from which one
adheres to monetarist thinking whereas the other builds expectations according to rational
principles. The distribution of knowledge among market agents and policymakers is as
follows:
• Monetarist believers, as in Section III above, build forward inflation expectations by
observing the money growth trend. They do not know, or do not take into account, that money
                                                
14 They are different from the equally named matrices in [20].
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is endogenous and that there are other agents who apply a more elaborate concept of
predicting inflation.
• This second group of agents understands the basic logic of the macro system, including the
existence of "stubborn" disciples of the quantity theory. As a consequence, rational agents also
attribute inflationary expectations to a rising money stock, just because they know that
inflationary pressures arise from the beliefs of monetarist agents. The prediction of future
inflation is derived from the preceding equations (see below). It is assumed that this second
group does not suffer from model, but from parameter uncertainty.15
• The central bank follows the instructions given in the Taylor rule [19]. As the rule contains
only contemporary variables, there is no need to decide on the most efficient pattern of
making inflation predictions. Central bankers subscribe to an eclectic and pragmatic way of
policy making; they include in their reaction rule all variables that might be relevant for the
issue of monetary stabilization: the output gap, money growth and inflation itself.
The group of rational-expectation believers understands that the market process [27],
which depends on their own prediction of future inflation, in equilibrium, including the
expectation effect, will show the form
v A v B s C et t t t= + +− −1 1 [28]
where the matrices A, B and C contain coefficients that are not given by the true parameters
of the market process [27].16 Rather, they represent a preliminary estimation on behalf of
rational, but imperfectly informed market agents. Based on [28], which represents the
"perceived law of motion" (PLM), market agents build their expectations on next period's
                                                
15 This small deviation from the traditional approach is necessary in order to bring at least some
realism into the model setup. "The [rational expectations] model is inhabited by super-rational agents
for whom the complexity of the world has few secrets. They continuously optimise their present and
future consumption plans and are capable of calculating with great precision what the effects will be
of interest changes implemented by the central bank. This is a fairytale world" (De Grauwe 2006).
16 The following solution algorithm extends the simple example given in Appendix I. It uses the
techniques described in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). See also Bullard and Mitra (2002) and
McCallum (2003). Equation [28] represents the "Minimal State Variable" (MSV) solution, suggested
by McCallum (1983), it uses the smallest number of state variables that conform to the structural
model [27].
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variables:
v A v B s A A v B s C e B s et 1
e
t
e
t
e
t t t t t+ − − −= + = + + + +1 1 1   η [29]
These expectations then become a part of the "actual law of motion" (ALM). Inserting [29]
into [27] yields, after rearranging terms,
v A v A B B s A C B et t t t= + + + + + + +− −Ω Ψ Ω Ω Φ Ω Ω Θ2 1 1     η [30]
The comparison of [28] and [30] now allows of a learning process: market agents are
supposed to adjust their preliminary chosen parameter values if actual experience deviates
from these figures (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). In the most simple form, the adjustment
process takes the form



A A A
B A B B B
C A C B C
= + −
= + + −
= + + −
Ω Ψ
Ω Ω Φ
Ω Ω Θ
2 
 
 
η [31]
Equilibrium is reached if assumed and realized values conform. Then the solution for the
matrices A∗ , B∗  and C∗, in principle, can be computed from
Ω Ψ
Ω Ω Φ
Ω Ω Θ
A A
A B B B
A C B C
2 + =
+ + =
+ + =
η [32]
If A∗  is found from the first equation17, the second and third equation can be solved for B∗
and C∗. This completes the general solution given in [28].
                                                
17 Technical difficulties arise from the matrix quadratic in the first equation. It was solved, after a
transformation into ( )I A A− =Ω Ψ , where I indicates the unity matrix, by multiplying and adding
up the elements on the left hand side, so that a 2 2×  matrix emerges on both sides. Equating term by
term on both sides then gives four (non-linear) equations which determine the four coefficients of A*.
In order to facilitate the computation, again the parameter calibration α λ= = 0 1. , δ = 1 and β = 3
was used. Nevertheless, two possible solutions emerge for the coefficients in A*. According to the
logic of MSV solutions, the set containing smaller values was chosen (where the eigenvalues are
smaller than unity); this widely shared analytical convention is derived from the supposition that
market agents, when designing their PLM, in principle envisage a stable process (McCallum 2003).
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Figure 3: eigenvalues of A∗  with fixed σ = 0 5.  (left), and γ = 0 5.  (right)
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The question whether the adjustment process of parameters actually converges to the
solution set [A B C∗ ∗ ∗, , ] is answered by checking the dynamic stability of the system [31].
Applying the test criteria given in Evans and Honkapohja (2001: 237-8), it can be shown by
way of numerical calculations that "expectational stability" of the learning process is given if
only one of the Taylor equation coefficients γ  or µ  is positive.
Next, the characteristics of the solution with regard to convergence and persistence can be
demonstrated by analyzing the variable eigenvalue of the A∗  matrix (the second one is a
constant). The following results stand out:
• If the weight of the monetarist group exceeds some small limit, convergence cannot be
obtained by only stabilizing the output gap (ϕ > 0  with γ µ= = 0).
• If the relative weight of the two groups of agents is fixed at σ = 0 5. , the (left) graph of
Figure 3 replicates the analytical finding that either γ  or µ  ought to be positive. Increasing γ
lowers persistence throughout, whereas µ  does so only with given small values of γ .
• If the inflation gap coefficient is fixed at γ = 0 5. , the (right) graph shows that increasing
the share18 of monetarist believers adds (slightly) to persistence; but this effect can be
cushioned by strengthening the weight given to the money growth target in the Taylor rule.19
                                                
18 Note that the model's solution is not defined at the limiting point σ = 1. The graphs therefore leave
out that region.
19 Both graphs assume a weak interest rate reaction to the output gap (ϕ = 0 1. ).
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Figure 4 (illustrating Equation [33]): multipliers of shock variability on output and inflation
variability, depending on the share of monetarist believers and the reaction to the money gap
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By analogy to the procedure in Section III20 the variability of output and inflation can be
computed as
var
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The matrix coefficients are displayed in Figures 4 and 5. Firstly, in addition to the parameter
calibration given in Fn. 17, the specification ϕ = 0 1.  and γ η θ= = = 0 5.  was made in order
to concentrate on the effects of monetarist beliefs (σ ) and monetarist policies (µ ); as in
                                                
20 Details in Appendix II.
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Section III, the normalization var varω ωm s   = = 1 is used.21
• The impact of money demand shocks on output can be neutralized by a cautiously chosen
reaction to money growth target violations. As in the scenarios of Figures 1 and 2, this
beneficial effect is reversed if the interest rate reaction is increased beyond the optimal degree.
The weight of the group of monetarists among market agents is more or less irrelevant for the
magnitude of ∆11 .
• Obviously, money demand shocks produces some extra inflation by way of inflationary
expectations. The multiplier ∆21 increases with the share of monetarist believers. Again, there
appears to be an optimal policy reaction µ , particularly if σ  is high. But too low and too high
values of µ  then add to inflation variability.
• The effect of supply shocks on output is dampened if monetarist beliefs and/or monetarist
policies exist (case ∆12). However, monetarist beliefs multiply the impact of these shocks on
inflation (case ∆22), again because money growth is endogenously increased, which then in
turn adds to inflationary expectations.
• In general, an increasing weight of monetarist beliefs adds to the variability of inflation.
Except for case ∆12 , strong monetarist policies increase output and inflation volatility;
positive money demand shocks prompt the central bank to react by rising interest rates that in
turn depress demand and (to a weaker extent) push the rate of inflation from its target.
Finally, in Figure 5, the focus is on the variable goods demand effect that is caused by a
money demand shock (the supply shock is no longer discussed). The question is whether a
rising value of θ  in g gt tm= + θ ε  is dampened more efficiently by interest rate reactions to
the money or the inflation gap, respectively. Hence, in addition to the parameter specification
in Fn. 17, ϕ = 0 1.  and σ η= = 0 5.  was chosen, and the θ  effect is displayed vis-à-vis
variable values of µ  and γ .
• The variable θ  effect emphasizes what has been found above: there might be an efficient
response by a money gap reaction of interest rates (if the inflation gap coefficient is zero). A
positive relation µ θ= f   is particularly pronounced with regard to output (case ∆11), and
                                                
21 The equations are not defined at the limiting points σ = 0  and σ = 1. Therefore, the graphs leave
out these regions.
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Figure 5 (illustrating Equation [33]): multipliers of money demand shock variability on output and
inflation variability, depending on a variable goods demand effect of money demand shocks, the
reaction to the money gap and the reaction to the inflation gap
γ = 0 µ = 0
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less so with regard to inflation (case ∆12). Again, the graphs also show the risks of money
targeting; output variability increases markedly with wrongly chosen values of µ .
• If on the other hand the central bank refrains from money targeting (µ = 0 ), the graphs
show that a stronger goods demand effect of money demand shocks can unambiguously be
countered by raising the inflation gap coefficient.22
                                                
22 Using the output gap coefficient ϕ  instead of γ would yield a very similar result with respect to
output variability. However, this policy strategy would not succeed to dampen the effect of a larger θ
on inflation variability.
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V Conclusions
The current debate on monetary policy strategies in the euro area time and again runs into the
question of attributing an appropriate role to monetary variables. After the demise of the IS-
LM model, it was difficult to find a place for money in an integrated formal theory of the
transmission process. The two-pillar Phillips curve offers a framework that allows to identify
empirically long-run (low-frequency) movements of inflation as distinct from short-run (high-
frequency) changes of inflation; the former, i.e. the shift parameter of the Phillips curve can be
assigned to the money growth trend, and the latter to the output gap.
From the point of view of macroeconomic theory, the two-pillar Phillips curve implies that
money growth affects inflation only by way of inflationary expectations. This deficiency can
be redressed if the two-pillar supply curve is used as a component of a simple macro model
where the behaviour of the central bank is described by a Taylor rule. Money growth basically
is endogenous, depending on output and inflation, but can also form demand-side determined
bubbles (which remain unexplained in the paper). The model takes into account serially
correlated supply and money demand shocks, and allows for goods demand shocks that result
from these money demand bubbles. Surely, the money growth trend is regarded as an indicator
for long-term inflationary risks; however, the notion "long-term" does not mean that
something might happen in the far future, but rather, that it will happen instantaneously as a
by-product of a return to a state of equilibrium. Hence, the belief in a fairly stable money
demand function implies a high probability of a positive goods demand shock in times of
excess money growth.
This poses the question of an adequate policy response. Adding a money growth target to a
standard Taylor rule essentially has the effect of strengthening interest rate reactions to the
inflation and the output gap. The crucial point is the occurrence of money demand shocks that
may – or may not – trigger an ensuing goods demand shock. The current paper has analyzed
the consequences of variable interest rate reactions to excess money growth. The model
simulation shows that exact quantitative information on the characteristics and the
interdependence of money-demand and goods-demand shocks are required on the part of the
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central bank. Otherwise interest rate reactions to money gaps cannot achieve efficient
stabilization results.
In case of imperfect information, relying on the more traditional inflation gap policy
generally appears to be the more robust monetary policy strategy (in some cases, putting
additional emphasis on the output gap coefficient also promises to deliver good results). If –
contrary to the model setup in this paper – there is only some probability of a goods demand
effect of a money demand bubble, there is even less reason to pursue a prophylactic monetary
restriction in case of excess money growth. Of course, no serious critic of the monetary pillar
ever demanded that the ECB should give up to observe monetary data.
The existence of monetarist beliefs among market agents aggravates the problem of
monetary stabilization as these beliefs produce inflationary expectations, i.e. supply side
pressure on price formation, which inevitably pose a conflict for any central bank. A
pragmatic response consists of fighting inflation and output gaps when they emerge; public
debates on the necessity of controlling money gaps exacerbate the problem that money gap
control is meant to solve.
Appendix I: Building model-consistent rational expectations
As an example, the following system of inflation pt  and the output gap yt , which for simplicity is
designed as AR(1) with φ < 1 and a demand shock ε td ,
p p y
y y
t t
e
t t
s
t t t
d
= + +
= +
+
−
δ α ε
φ ε
1
1
[A.1]
has a general solution of the form
p c yt t t
s= + ε [A.2]
where c is an undetermined coefficient. It follows that, taking time t expectations,
p c y c yt
e
t
e
t+ += =1 1 φ [A.3]
After inserting [A.3] into [A.1], and then comparing the coefficients of [A.1] and [A.3], we find the
specific solution
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p yt t t
s= − +
α
δ φ ε1 [A.4]
Appendix II: Computing variances of endogenous variables
System [20] is tranformed into two equations for output and inflation, respectively, where the matrix
coefficients of X = Ψ , Φ , Θ  are denoted by Χij  terms. Squaring both sides of each equation gives
var
var var var var var
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var var var var var
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m s m s
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[A.5]
Taking into account that [13] implies
var
var
var
varε ω
η
ε ω
η
m
m
m
s
s
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
−
=
−1 12 2
and [A.6]
yields the matrix equation [22].
The same procedure is used for computing the expression [33]. We start from [28], substitute the set
of solutions A B C∗ ∗ ∗, , , and obtain
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[A.7]
By using again [A.6], the equations in [A.7] can be solved for var y  and var p .
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